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ABSTRACT
BGP communities are widely used to tag prefix aggregates in order
to efficiently implement policy, traffic engineering, and inter-AS
signaling. Because each individual AS defines its own community
semantics, many ASes blindly propagate communities they do not
recognize in routing announcements. Prior research has shown the
potential security vulnerabilities possible when communities are
not properly filtered. In this work, we shed light on a second unin-
tended side-effect of communities and open propagation policies:
an increase in unnecessary BGP routing messages. We examine 10
years of BGP messages observed at two route collector systems.
In 2020, around 25% of all announcements update the community
attribute, but not the AS path. Further 25% update neither. Using
beacon prefixes, we find that communities can lead to an increase
in number of update messages, at the tagging AS, but also at neigh-
boring ASes that neither add nor filter communities – primarily
geolocation communities during path exploration events: On a
single day, 63% of all unique community attributes are revealed ex-
clusively due to global withdrawals. While it is well-recognized that
intra-AS next-hop or MED changes can cause spurious updates, we
show in controlled laboratory experiments that they can be due to
communities only, and transitively through the AS path. We show
that different router implementations contribute to this behavior -
per default - violating BGP specifications.
1 INTRODUCTION
Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), the Internet’s inter-domain routing
protocol, is fundamental to the operation, policies, and economics
of the network. Unsurprisingly, the real-world behavior of BGP
has been subject to intense research scrutiny [13, 23, 27]. As an
extensible protocol, BGP and its usage have evolved in response to
operator needs. BGP communities [5, 19] are a transitive attribute
to provide meta-information that goes beyond the basic reachability
functionality of BGP.
The values and semantics of most BGP communities are not stan-
dardized. Communities are used to conveniently tag (an aggregate)
of prefixes to enable particular actions or policy, but the meaning
of a specific community value is defined by individual ASes. Benoit
et al. first defined a taxonomy where, broadly speaking, commu-
nities are used by an AS to tag received prefixes to aid internal
routing decisions, or added to outbound announcements as a con-
venient signaling mechanism [5]. Today, communities are known
to encode location identifiers [8, 10] express policy preferences to
an upstream [11] enable selective advertisement in Internet Ex-
change Points (IXPs) [12, 24], and as a distributed denial of service
(DDoS) mitigation signal [4, 9] (e.g. BGP blackholing [2, 15]). BGP
communities have seen rapidly increasing adoption during the last
years. For instance, Streibelt et al. found a 250% increase in the
number of unique communities and a 200% increase in the number
of autonomous systems (ASes) that use communities as seen in
BGP advertisements between 2010 and 2018 [30]. Giotsas et al. [7]
report that around 50% of the IPv4 BGP and 30% of the IPv6 BGP
announcements in 2016 include at least one location-tagged BGP
community.
Despite the rich literature on BGP and BGP communities, prior
work has not investigated the unintended impact of communities
on the volume of BGP message traffic in the wild. In this work, we
take a first step towards this larger goal by examining changes in
AS paths and communities in billions of update messages at 500+
peers over 10 years. We find that updates with no path change are
common throught the entire measuremend period and are rooted in
widespread community deployment, increasingly interconnected
networks, and lack of community filtering. More specifically, we
find:
(1) Around 50% of announcements in March 2020 signal no path
change, while half of them show a change in communities.
(2) In laboratory experiments and in the wild, we show that
community geo-tagging in combination with missing or in-
effective cleaning can lead to an increase of update messages.
(3) We find that while all tested routers, i.e., Cisco IOS, Junos
OS, and BIRD generate updates without AS path change by
default, Junos OS at least prevents duplicates.
(4) By utilizing beacon prefixes we show that more than 60% of
all encoded information in community attributes is revealed
during global withdrawals, as a result of path exploration.
Our findings afford a better understanding of routing instabilities
in the Internet, and may help foster detection of anomalous com-
munities in the future. We provide a discussion on the implications
of our findings and suggest future work.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
In this section, we provide details of BGP relevant to understanding
our work on communities, as well as a summary of prior relevant
research. We assume working familiarity with BGP; see [27] for a
broad overview.
Path Exploration: The BGP decision process is complicated, in-
volving iBGP, eBGP and IGP interaction, is governed by individual
network policies, and beholden to BGP implementation behaviors.
There is a basic tension between propagating reachability informa-
tion quickly and sending it before the AS has converged on a new
best state. Thus, updates often occur in bursts.
Several prior works analyze network stability, path exploration,
and the tradeoff in withholding updates. Mechanisms such as route
dampening and MRAI timers [3] have been explored, but may
offer suboptimal performance in reacting to routing events [32].
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Thus, these mechanisms are selectively deployed. Indeed, we show
that path exploration, combined with BGP community use, is a
significant contributor to BGP update traffic.
Duplicate Updates: As with the protocol itself, BGP update be-
havior has been extensively studied, for instance to understand
routing dynamics [18], understand convergence and forwarding
behavior [20], quantify path performance [33], and locate origins of
instabilities [6]. Of most relevance to our present study are so-called
“duplicate” BGP updates, superfluous messages that do not update
routing state, first identified by Labovitz in 1998 [16]. Originally be-
lieved to be due to buggy implementations, Park et al. subsequently
demonstrated that iBGP/eBGP interaction was the primary cause
of these duplicates [22]. As we also find, when a router receives
an internal update with a changed attribute, that attribute may be
removed prior to the induced message to an eBGP peer. Hauweele
et al. later demonstrated in both real and lab experiments that MED
and next-hop attribute changes induce these duplicates [14].
While duplicate updates have been a recognized issue for decades,
we first show via controlled lab experiments in §3 the propagation
and update implications of adding communities to BGP announce-
ments. Second, our work highlights the effects of increased BGP
community use on duplicates. We show that BGP geolocation com-
munities are a primary source of unnecessary updates, and induce
inter-AS message traffic even when communities are filtered.
Communities: BGP messages are relatively simple and include
prefix updates (often termed an “announcement”) as well as prefix
withdrawals (indicating that the prefix should be removed from
the routing table). In addition, BGP messages can include multiple
optional attributes, among them the next-hop, MED, and commu-
nity. Among these, BGP communities are notable because they are
transitive – meaning that they are an optional attribute that must
be propagated. Thus, communities are focus of our study. As we
will show, not only are BGP communities in common use, but they
are a primary contributor to overall BGP message traffic.
Benoit et al. provides a taxonomy of BGP communities in [5]. As
a contemporary convention, BGP communities can be broadly di-
vided into informational communities and action communities [29].
Informational communities are typically added to ingress routing
announcements to tag aggregates of routes in a common way in
order for an AS to make internal policy and routing decisions. For
instance, a common informational community used by large ASes
is to encode the physical geolocation, e.g. “North America, Dallas,
TX”, where a prefix is received.
In contrast, action communities are frequently added to egress
routing announcements in order to implement in-band signaling
to the next AS. For instance, a common use of action communities
is the blackhole community which indicates that a provider should
stanch traffic for a particular IP or prefix that is experiencing a DoS
attack.
With the growth in BGP community adoption, researchers have
in recent years explored community prevalence and security [5, 30],
as well as the information they leak about connectivity, attacks,
and outages [7, 9]. However, less attention has been given to the
unintended impacts of communities on the volume of BGP message
traffic in general, and updates in particular – these are the focus of
the present research.
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Figure 1: Laboratory topology to understand conditions gen-
erating BGP update messages
3 CONTROLLED EXPERIMENTS
To validate our findings and inferences, as well as to afford a deeper
understanding of the root causes of the BGP update phenomenon
we observe in the wild, we conduct a series of experiments in a
controlled laboratory setting.
For each run of the experiments, we configure all routers that
are depicted in Figure 1 to use one of the following routing soft-
ware: Cisco IOS (12.4(20)T and XR 6.0.1), Juniper Junos OS (Olive
12.1R1.9), as well as the BIRD routing daemon (v1.6.6 and v2.0.7). By
using real router images, we can gain insight into real-world BGP
implementation behavior. Because we find identical behaviors for
most of the experiments, we report only on the common behavior
and where it deviates.
The lab topology is crafted to test several scenarios, with and
without communities, to understand the conditions that generate
BGP update messages and when those update messages are propa-
gated. The topology consists of four autonomous systems: 𝑋,𝑌, 𝑍
and 𝐶 . Router 𝐶1 mimics a route collector, while 𝑍1 originates the
prefix 𝑝 . The links in the topology correspond to both physical
connections and eBGP and iBGP sessions. AS 𝑌 has three routers
within its network; both 𝑌2 and 𝑌3 peer with AS 𝑍 .
Prior to running our experiments, we verify that only BGP
keepalive messages are sent once the network has converged. We
are interested only in BGP update and withdrawal messages in this
work; keepalives are pairwise heartbeat messages to test liveness.
Exp1: We begin without any BGP communities to characterize
default behavior. Note that border router 𝑌1 has two paths to reach
𝑝 . In the absence of any policy, the BGP tie breaker selects 𝑌2 as
the next hop. Therefore, to induce BGP updates, we disable the 𝑌1
to 𝑌2 link, and perform a packet capture of all messages arriving at
the collector 𝐶1 and between 𝑋1 and 𝑌1.
Without BGP communities, when 𝑌1 chooses a new next hop
of 𝑌3, it sends an update message to 𝑋1 even though the AS path
has not changed (Note: Junos does not generate duplicates). How-
ever, this update message does not propagate further – no update
message is observed at the collector.
Exp2: Next, we consider the common scenario where AS 𝑌 im-
plements communities that geographically tag incoming advertise-
ments. 𝑌2 adds community Y:300 on ingress while 𝑌3 adds Y:400.
Because𝑌2 is preferred, and no community filtering is implemented
in this network, the collector sees 𝑝 with Y:300. We again disable
the 𝑌1 to 𝑌2 link.
Again, this induces an update message from 𝑌1 to 𝑋1. While the
AS path is unchanged, this update includes a changed community
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value of Y:400. Because the community value changed, 𝑋1 also
sends an update which is seen at the collector. Note that while
updates sent by 𝑌1 can be due to an internal next-hop change (as
in Exp1), in the case of 𝑋1 the next-hop does not change. Thus, a
change in the community attribute can be the sole trigger for an
update.
Exp3: We implement community filtering on 𝑋1 by configuring
it to remove all communities on egress. We again flap the 𝑌1 to 𝑌2
link to generate the update message. Surprisingly, even though 𝑋1
is removing communities, it still sends an update to the collector
(Again, Junos does not generate duplicates). Note that this update
has an unchanged AS path and includes no communities – i.e. it is
an arguably unnecessary message.
Exp4: We then repeat experiment 3, but modify 𝑋1 to filter
communities on ingress from 𝑌1. In this case, the spurious update
message is not sent as the communities are not contained in the
router’s RIB. This shows that we can differentiate between ingress
and egress community cleaning.
Summary: From the tested routing software, by default, only
Junos prevents duplicates from being generated by, e.g., internal
changes or community filtering on egress. We note that sending up-
dates with no changes contradicts BGP specifications. Furthermore,
all routers generate updates that are triggered only due a change in
the community attribute, if communities are not filtered at ingress.
Our findings imply that this behavior is transitive.
4 DATA SETS
To study the impact of BGP communities on update message prop-
agation, we use publicly available archived routing traffic from
RouteViews [28] and RIPE RIS [26] collectors. We obtain all up-
dates, inclusive of both IPv4 and IPv6 prefixes, for a full day every 3
months (2019-03-15, 2019-06-15, 2019-09-15, etc.) across a ten-year
span (2010 to 2020).
Prior to analyzing our update message data, we first perform ba-
sic filtering, cleaning, and normalization. Using current and histori-
cal allocation information from the regional registries, we remove
BGP messages that contain an unallocated ASN or prefix at the time
of the message. We did not aggregate overlapping prefixes, and we
keep prefixes with length smaller than /24. Next, we note that many
of the route collector peers are IXP route servers, some of which
do not include their own ASN in the announcements. To avoid
overcounting peer ASes and avoid ambiguity when processing the
data, we add the ASN of the route server to the AS path. Finally,
some BGP collectors only record messages at the single second
granularity. When multiple messages arrive in the same second for
these collectors, we preserve the message ordering and assume that
each subsequent message arrives 0.01ms after the last.
In the remainder of this paper, we refer to the resulting data
set as 𝑑ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡 . We use *𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑟20 to point to the most recent data in
our measurements, which is March 15, 2020. Table 1 provides an
overview of *𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑟20. There are approximately 1.5k sessions across
nearly 600 unique AS peers. The number of BGP sessions at these
two collector projects has roughly doubled over this time.
Routing Beacons: Routing beacons are prefixes with the only
purpose to announce and withdraw particular routes at periodic
Table 1: Overview *𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑟20
IPv4 prefixes 1,071,150 Announcements 1,008M
IPv6 prefixes 99,141 w/ communities 737.0M
ASes 68,911 uniq. 16 bits 5,778
Sessions 1,504 uniq. AS paths 43.9M
Peers 581 Withdrawals 38.5M
Table 2: Announcement types overview (share in *𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑟20 and
𝑑𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑐𝑜𝑛)
type observed changes *𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑟20 𝑑𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝑝𝑐 path + community 33.7% 44.6%
𝑝𝑛 path only 15.1% 29.9%
nc community only 24.5% 13.8%
nn no change 25.7% 11.2%
𝑥𝑐 path prepending + comm. 0.3% 0.2%
𝑥𝑛 path prepending only 0.7% 0.3%
intervals. This can help network operators and researchers investi-
gate the behavior of the routing system as well as anomalies. RIPE
operates such routing beacons [25] with an update pattern of a
single announcement every 4 hours, starting at 00:00 UTC, and a
single withdrawal every 4 hours, starting at 02:00 UTC. One specific
beacon prefix is announced per route collector.
From 𝑑ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡 , we select all updates that contain one of 15 selected
beacon prefixes in March 15, 2020. We observe 307,984 announce-
ments and 56,640 withdrawals spread over all sessions (577), peers
(340), and collectors (34) in 𝑑𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑐𝑜𝑛 . We refer to this subset as
𝑑𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑐𝑜𝑛 .
5 ANNOUNCEMENT TYPES
To better understand those announcements, we first group them
by the prefix and the BGP session of a peer AS / next-hop, in
arriving order. Then, we look for changes in the AS path, AS path
prepending, and the community attribute from one announcement
to the next. Since these attributes can change independently of each
other, we define six different combinations of two letters to label
the announcement type. The first letter indicates a path change and
the second letter indicates a change in the community attribute: pc,
pn, nc, nn, xc, xn.
An announcement with a path change only is in the category
𝑝𝑛. If the path change is only due to path prepending (the set of
ASes are equal), it is in 𝑥𝑛. If, in addition to the AS path also the
community attribute deviates, the announcement is in 𝑝𝑐 (or 𝑥𝑐
in case of path prepending). While we intuitively expect 𝑝𝑛, 𝑝𝑐, 𝑥𝑛
and 𝑥𝑐 updates, we also see updates without a path change: 𝑛𝑐 and
𝑛𝑛 cover all announcements with no path change, while the former
also includes changes in the community attribute. We note that 𝑛𝑛
announcements also includes two empty community attributes in
succession. Also, we acknowledge a change in the MED attribute
as a reason for an nn announcement. Where necessary, we do a
manual check.
Statistics: Table 2 provides a break-down of the possible obser-
vations. We note that 𝑛𝑐 and 𝑛𝑛 – the only types that do not include
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Figure 2: Number of daily announcements per type in RIPE
and Routeviews collectors (2009-2020).
a path change – make up more than half of all announcements
(24.5% and 25.7% respectively). The largest group of announce-
ments is of type pc with a share of 33.7%, while pn announcements
constitute 15.1%. Interestingly, the number of announcements with
path prepending is negligibly small, contributing around 1%. For
comparison, we also provide the share of types in 𝑑𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑐𝑜𝑛 . Here,
we see a different distribution. While nc and nn together contribute
25% to all announcements, pc is the most dominant type with a
share of 44.6%, followed by pn with 29.9% share. Again, xn and xc
are low in numbers. We remind that beacon prefixes provide us
with a more controlled view on the update behavior since they are
announced and withdrawn at stated intervals. In the wild, however,
unpredictable changes at the origin AS can add to the dynamics of
update propagation at all downstream paths.
Next, we investigate the longitudinal behavior of announcement
types. In Figure 2, we highlight the evolution of the individual
constituents. While in the first 5 years, the ratios of types are com-
parable, in the second 5 years the numbers drift apart. Most notable
are the types pc and nn. Not only are they historically the most
dominant of all types, they are also responsible for the high varia-
tions of announcements over time.1 Although not as dynamically
evolving, the number of nc and pn announcements is constantly
high. We note that despite increased community usage, the share of
all types is relatively stable. We can also confirm a similar stability
on a daily basis.
6 UNNECESSARY UPDATES
Next, we study communities in announcementswith no path change
and their impact on update propagation. We focus on announce-
ments for individual beacon prefixes (𝑑𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑐𝑜𝑛) visible in BGP ses-
sions over 24 hours.
BGP Sessions. We begin by investigating how each peer AS
perceives announcement types, i.e., pc, pn, nc, nn, xc, and xn. The
stacked bar plot in Figure 3 shows all the BGP sessions that are
visible in collector rrc00. They are sorted by number of announce-
ments visible for prefix 84.205.64.0/24 ∈ 𝑑𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑐𝑜𝑛 . Further, the colors
indicate the announcement type, see legend. We observe that each
session shows a different number of announcements. But more in-
teresting is the fact that each session shows a diverse distribution of
announcements types, despite looking only at a single beacon pre-
fix. To this end, the root causes, i.e., why nc and nn announcements
1The spike of nn activity around mid of 2012 is an artifact of an AS that sends a burst
of updates for an unknown reason.
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Figure 4: Announcement types over time with prefix
84.205.64.0/24 and AS path (20205 3356 174 12654). Geo-
tagging induces nc announcements.
are sent in the first place, remain unclear. Thus, in the following
we take a close look at those announcement types.
Community Exploration. In order to study the root causes for
nc announcements, we consider a single BGP session. In Figure 4
we plot the cumulative sum of announcements over 24 hours of
March 15, 2020. We plot all announcements for the same prefix
84.205.64.0/24 ∈ 𝑑𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑐𝑜𝑛 via a single AS path (20205 3356 174
12654). Vertical yellow lines indicate the arrival of a withdrawal
message for that prefix, confirming the withdrawal interval for
routing beacons.
All announcements for this particular route and day show up
only during the withdrawal phases, i.e., at around 02:00, 06:00, 10:00,
etc. We deduce that this particular route was never a best path dur-
ing that day (all time best path: 20205 6939 50304 12654). During
the withdrawal events we observe a total of 19 announcements:
Starting with a pc update (6 total), i.e., an announcement with
changed path and community, followed by multiple (13 total) nc’s,
announcements with changing community only. A quick look at
the data shows that the peer AS20205 does not set any commu-
nities. However, it does not clean communities from its neighbor
either: The changing communities in nc announcements represent
encoded ingress locations set presumably by AS3356. We observe a
total of 9 locations encoded in 19 announcements: 9 city commu-
nities, two country and two geographical regions, i.e., Europe and
North America. Per withdrawal phase, the location communities
are mostly unique.
Due to distinct location communities attached to a single route,
multiple nc announcements occur (comparable to Exp2 in §3). Anal-
ogously to path exploration, we refer to this behavior as community
exploration: Instead of mulitple paths being announced, multiple
4
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Figure 6: Revealed unique community attributes during
withdrawal phases of all RIPE beacon prefixes over time.
communities for a single path are announced. Also, the example
above demonstrates that setting communities by one AS, can im-
pact the update behavior of a different AS, if no proper filtering is
in place (comparable to Exp4).
Duplicate Announcements. Next, we explore a possible rea-
son for the occurrence of nn updates. Therefore, we choose a route
similar to the previous community exploration example. However,
we replace the peer AS with one that removes all communities
(in >99% of the cases). Figure 5 shows the cumulative sum of an-
nouncements over the day of March 15, 2020. We plot announce-
ments for the same prefix (84.205.64.0/24), but via a different AS
path (20811 3356 174 12654). Vertical yellow lines represent
withdrawal messages for that prefix, again in accordance with the
predefined intervals. Again, all 31 announcements occur during the
withdrawal events. Also, the phases begin with a path change (6
total), here pn, followed by a series of nn announcements (25 total).
Deduced from our previous observations, we speculate that dur-
ing the withdrawal phase AS 20811 simply reannounces multiple
nc’s from 3356 (as a implicit withdrawal) and remove the existing
communities prior to announcing, thus inducing nn announce-
ments. Note, we have demonstrated the possibility for such a be-
havior in the lab experiments (Exp3). Also, we manually re-visit
the raw BGP data and confirm that no attribute, e.g., the MED, has
changed and no other prefix is included in the updates towards the
collector. Since our observations are limited to inter-AS changes,
we do not exclude the possibility for other reasons we observe nn
announcements, e.g., streams of updates due to intra-AS changes,
misconfiguration, or rate limiting.
Revealed Information.We have shown that geo-tagging can
lead to bursts of announcements just updating the community
attribute, which can lead to re-announcements by neighboring
ASes, in a lab experiment and in the wild.
Next, we investigate the amount of information that is revelealed
as a result of community exploration. Therefore, we utilize the fixed
announcement and withdrawal phases of the beacon prefixes. We
label all announcements ∈ 𝑑𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑐𝑜𝑛 according to their appearances
in any of the predefined phases, or outside them. We consider all
announcements that appear withing 15 minutes of the respective
phase begins, e.g., between 2:00 to 2:15 UTC for the first withdrawal
phase.
InMarch 15, 2020, we identify a total of 21.398 unique community
attributes. 62% of all community attributes are revealed exclusively
during the withdrawal phases. Only 17% are revealed during the
announcement phases and <1% outside both phases. The remaining
attributes show up ambigiously. Historically, this distribution is
stable, as can be seen in Figure 6. While the number of unique
community attributes per day during withdrawal phases increased
multifold in the last ten years, so did the total number, resulting in
a stable ratio of about 60%.
7 DISCUSSION
As the Internet’s core interdomain routing protocol, the BGP has
been extensively studied. While previous work has found duplicate
updates in the wild [16] and identified potential causes [14, 22], we
show that BGP communities play a large role in the generation of un-
necessary updates. First, as a transitive property of BGP messages,
communities can induce updates to propagate through the entire
routing system even when the path information is unchanged, the
routing decision algorithm is unaffected, and the receiving AS does
not recognize the community. Second, even when communities
are filtered by an intermediate AS, common implementations still
generate a duplicate update, just without the community. While du-
plicate updates without communities do not continue to propagate,
we show that they represent a sizable fraction of BGP messages
seen at route collectors and are unnecessary traffic.
Prior work has shown that the lack of filtering and widespread
propagation of BGP communities can leak information about net-
works’ operation and practices [7, 9] and peering [8, 10], and can
even be exploited to attack the routing system [30]. Our findings in
this work demonstrate an additional motivation for more rigorous
community filtering: reducing unnecessary duplicate update traffic.
Not only does the unnecessary traffic impact router load and con-
vergence times [1], it increases the load and storage requirements
of systems that monitor BGP traffic including route collectors.
Further, as the global use of communities increases and ASes
become increasingly interconnected, the impact of that filtering
will place even more strain on the system. As such, our primary
recommendation in this work is to add yet another motivation for
operators to properly filter BGP communities.
However, we note several other implications of our findings that
we plan to study in future work. First, communities are somewhat
paradoxical to BGP’s emphasis on scalability and information hid-
ing. For instance, the updates we observe often allow us to remotely
infer the number of interconnections between two ASes and the
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location where they peer. Second, from observing updates and lack
of updates at multiple points in the network, we can make rough
guesses as to the way different ASes handle communities. Using
more sophisticated network tomography techniques, we plan to
classify per-AS community behavior, for instance those that tag,
filter, and ignore. In future work we will use this information to es-
timate the impact of unnecessary communities per-AS. Finally, we
believe that communities can enrich our understanding of anoma-
lous behavior in the routing system beyond existing approaches. By
characterizing theway individual ASes observe and process commu-
nities, our work provides a first step toward predicting anomalous
communities.
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